In this paper, we develop a new approach to test whether momentum is indeed an anomaly in that it re ‡ects delayed reactions, or continued overreactions, to …rm speci…c news. Our methodology does not depend on a speci…c model of expected returns and, more importantly, does not require a decomposition of momentum pro…ts. Yet we provide distinct testable predictions that can discriminate between the two diametrically opposed causes for the pro…tability of momentum strategies:
Introduction
The proposition that the idiosyncratic component of individual …rms'returns displays continuation now appears to be widely accepted among academics and practitioners. Evidence of this acceptance can be found in the proliferation of papers that model individual asset prices in ways that generate positive serial covariance in idiosyncratic asset returns. 1 The literature has drawn this conclusion based on the …ndings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and numerous subsequent papers. Jegadeesh and Titman show …rst that buying extreme winners and selling extreme losers generates annualized raw returns of 8% to 18% over three-to 12-month holding periods. Second, the pro…tability of these strategies is robust across …rms of di¤erent market capitalizations and CAPM betas. Finally, the authors conduct tests to establish that the pro…tability of momentum strategies is driven entirely by the …rm-speci…c component of an individual asset's return. The main conclusion of their study is that the ". . . evidence is consistent with delayed price reactions to …rm-speci…c information."
The remarkable aspect of momentum is that it has proven to be both empirically robust and to defy a rational explanation. Fama (1998) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) re ‡ect the general consensus in the literature when they pronounce momentum to be an anomaly worthy of a behavioral explanation. Similarly, Jegadeesh and Titman (2005) , after reviewing the momentum literature, conclude that ". . . momentum e¤ect is quite pervasive and is very unlikely to be explained by risk." This is particularly surprising because, unlike many anomalies, momentum immediately lends itself to a simple economic explanation. As has long been recognized, strategies that rely on relative strength should be expected to earn positive returns due to cross-sectional variation in expected returns of individual securities. Since, on average, stocks with relatively high (low) returns will be those with relatively high (low) expected returns, a momentum strategy should on average earn positive pro…ts. Thus, cross-sectional variation in either unconditional or conditional mean returns should contribute to the pro…tability of momentum strategies. 2 The key element of this simple explanation is that momentum is a cross-sectional phenomenon and it attributes little, if any, of the strategy's pro…ts to time-series predictability in the idiosyncratic component of individual stock returns.
In this paper, we revisit this explanation for the pro…tability of momentum trading strategies.
We do so by proposing an alternative methodology for ascertaining if pro…ts to momentum strategies derive from idiosyncratic components. Importantly, we bypass the seemingly critical step of modeling and, more importantly estimating, the mean returns of securities. This key feature of our 1 As examples, see de Long, et al. (1990) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) , and Wu (2007) . Several empirical papers investigate this issue; among several others, see Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) , Lee and Swaminathan (2000) , and Hou and Moskowitz (2005) . Our collective acceptance that momentum is an anomaly is also signaled by studies that attempt to gauge whether the frequent turnover involved in relative strength strategies can withstand the transactions costs inherent to such strategies [see, for example, Korajzyck and Sadka (2004) and Sadka (2006) ]. 2 Cross-sectional variation in unconditional mean returns as a source of momentum pro…ts is investigated in Conrad and Kaul (1998) . Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) , Cochrane (1996) , Johnson (2002) , Lewellen (2002) , and Liu and Zhang (2007) investigate conditional variation in mean returns. modeling and methodology makes our inferences reliable and immune to model misspeci…cation and measurement errors that plague past studies. Speci…cally, we recognize that attempts to determine the pro…t sources of the traditional momentum strategy, which classi…es individual securities as winners and losers, su¤er from a classic identi…cation problem. Namely, we can only observe the total momentum pro…ts and, consequently, decomposing them into rational and idiosyncratic components requires the speci…cation and estimation of a model for mean returns. We instead impose a minimal set of restrictions on the return generating process, and show that the pattern in expected momentum pro…ts using portfolios of especially a small number of securities will be distinctly di¤erent if pro…ts arise from cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks versus time series variation in idiosyncratic returns. The key is to implement momentum strategies with winner and loser portfolios, as opposed to winner and loser individual stocks.
Speci…cally, we show that if momentum is due to continuation in the …rm-speci…c component of returns, the pro…ts of momentum strategies will decline at the rate of 1 n ; where n is the number of securities included in the portfolios, ultimately converging to zero in large portfolios. This pattern of declining pro…ts is independent of the procedure used to form the portfolios. In contrast, we show that if momentum pro…ts are due to cross-sectional variation in expected returns and risks of individual securities, the portfolio formation procedure is crucial to discriminating between the di¤erent sources of the pro…ts. If portfolios are created randomly, the pro…ts of momentum strategies will also decline at the rate of 1 n . If, however, portfolios are formed on the basis of past return performance of individual securities, then expected momentum pro…ts will show a dramatically di¤erent pattern. Under reasonable assumptions, the expected momentum pro…ts will remain insensitive to the number of securities in the portfolios, especially for portfolios containing a small number of securities. The intuition for this result is quite simple: in the absence of observing the true mean returns and risks, the formation of portfolios based on the past performance of individual securities comes closest to forming portfolios based on the mean returns and risks themselves. This, in turn, implies that if there is cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks of securities, this potential source of pro…tability will be maintained even when momentum strategies are implemented using portfolios of stocks. We can distinguish between, and determine the relative importance of, rational and irrational sources of momentum pro…ts by using portfolios containing as few as two securities.
As noted above, attributing momentum pro…ts to cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks is intuitive and natural, and we are not the …rst to examine its role in explaining momentum strategy pro…ts. Using a speci…c parametric model, Fama and French (1996) examine the performance of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in explaining a wide variety of patterns in security returns. The authors note that momentum is the main embarrassment to their three-factor model, in that loadings of stock returns on the factors fail to explain any part of the success of momentum strategies. Conrad and Kaul (1998) …nd that virtually all of the pro…ts to momentum strategies can be traced to cross-sectional variation in unconditional mean returns. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) dispute their …ndings, stating that while cross-sectional variation in unconditional mean returns is a legitimate theoretical candidate for the pro…ts of momentum strategies, it has a trivial role to play in generating actual momentum pro…ts. 3 Given nearly …fteen years of evidence supporting a …rm-speci…c explanation for momentum pro…ts, why is there a need for another paper about cross-sectional determinants of momentum pro…ts? Moreover, what is di¤erent about our approach? First, if continuation in …rm-speci…c component of returns is responsible for the pro…ts of momentum strategies, the implications for modern asset pricing are dire. An improper adjustment of asset prices to information that persists for three to twelve months is a blatant violation of market e¢ ciency in its weakest form [Fama (1970) ]. Even more importantly, idiosyncratic momentum rules out any cross-sectional variation in the mean returns and risks of individual securities which is another telling blow to modern …nance.
This conclusion is explicitly reached in Titman (2001, 2002) , and Chen and Hong (2002) motivate their paper by a simple model of momentum in which ". . . every asset has the same mean and beta: i = and i = = 1."
As alluded to earlier, these conclusions are based on empirical methodologies that are susceptible to erroneous inferences. Past research has felt compelled to propose and estimate a speci…c model for expected returns in order to determine the sources of momentum pro…ts. This, however, creates the classic joint-inference problem emphasized by Fama (1970) of accepting/rejecting market e¢ ciency or a speci…c model of expected returns. Moreover, the estimation of any model of expected returns is plagued by small-sample problems that could lead to erroneous inferences [see, for example, Black (1993) and Merton (1980) ]. In the case of momentum, the joint-inference and estimation problems common to past studies could potentially have led to questionable conclusions about market e¢ ciency and the intuitively appealing idea that risk and return should vary across di¤erent assets.
The di¤erence in our approach relative to existing studies is that we develop sharp testable implications that can easily discriminate between rational and irrational sources of momentum pro…ts regardless of a speci…c model of expected returns. Importantly, because our approach estimates neither a pricing model nor mean returns, it is immune to criticisms of existing approaches in the literature. That is, our results can be attributed neither to model misspeci…cation nor to small sample errors in estimating means. Thus, we provide a powerful alternative methodology to standard decompositions of the pro…ts of relative strength strategies. Based on the pro…tability of momentum strategies implemented using portfolios of securities we show that there is no evidence to support the widely held belief that momentum is an anomaly.
When securities are combined into portfolios after being ranked based on their past performance, the pro…ts of the momentum strategies do not decline with an increase in the number of securities.
In fact, the average pro…t estimates of the portfolio strategies remain unchanged not only when the portfolios contain two securities, but even when reasonably large portfolios (with up to 50 securities in each) are used to implement the momentum strategy. This pattern is witnessed during the overall 1926-2006 period, and is present consistently in each of the four 20-year sub-periods. Consequently, there is no evidence of any momentum in the idiosyncratic component of individual-security returns.
We also present detailed analysis and robustness tests to support this conclusion.
Although our evidence is strongly supportive of the notion that all of the momentum pro…ts are driven by cross-sectional variation in required returns and risks of securities, some other sources of common variation across stocks could also generate these pro…ts. For example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Lewellen (2002) consider scenarios in which common stock return movements give rise to momentum; the former suggest industry co-movements, while the latter proposes leadlag relations among stocks of di¤erent (size, book-to-market, industry) characteristics. However, the industry e¤ect has been criticized in Grundy and Martin (2001) because it is fragile and may be generated by market microstructure biases. They show that the pro…tability of the speci…c sixmonth strategies used by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) disappears when there is a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods of the strategies. Based on a battery of tests, they conclude that momentum is a …rm-speci…c time series phenomenon. Chen and Hong (2002) provide evidence that lead-lag e¤ects have no role to play in generating momentum pro…ts. Indeed, the authors ask, " [w] hat are the economic mechanisms behind individual stock momentum?" (italics added) Our evidence suggests that this question is moot, as individual stock momentum (i.e., momentum driven by …rm-speci…c news) does not exist.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the derivation of our theoretical predictions for patterns in momentum pro…ts for individual-security-based strategies as well as portfolio-based strategies. This section also contains the formulation of hypothesis tests that can be devised to distinguish between, and determine the relative importance of, the competing (rational versus irrational) sources of momentum. In Section 3, we present the detailed results of these tests and some additional robustness experiments. Section 4 summarizes our main results and discusses their implications.
Sources of Momentum Pro…ts

Strategy Using Individual Securities
Consider the momentum trading strategy implemented in the literature that ranks individual securities based on their relative strength. This strategy involves buying winners from the proceeds of selling losers, where winners and losers are determined based on the performance of a single security relative to the market. In this paper, we use all securities on the NYSE and AMEX, a fairly standard practice in the literature that permits us to analyze the pro…ts of momentum strategies in a very intuitive and well-accepted manner. 4 The weight received by each security in the momentum strategy, w i t , is given by:
The equal-weighted market return is de…ned as r m;t 1
Notice that the weight given to each security in this strategy is proportional to its deviation from the equal-weighted market return so that extreme winners/losers end up getting the most weight. A perusal of (1) also makes it clear that the sum of the weights add up to zero, thus making it a zero-investment strategy. The investment long (or short) is given by:
And the momentum pro…t can be written as:
In our empirical results, we will primarily present average estimates of momentum pro…ts given in (3), but we will also present the investment estimates and the scaled momentum pro…ts, that is, pro…ts scaled by the level of investment long/short. This is done primarily to provide a sense of the economic magnitude of the pro…ts of the zero-investment strategy. In a world without wealth constraints, however, comparing scaled pro…ts would make little sense because arbitrage pro…ts can be scaled arbitrarily [see Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) ]. In this context, it is also important to realize that scaled pro…ts could be higher for a strategy simply because the investment long/short is lower. Note that the investment in (2) is essentially a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of returns, and will be lower in some periods compared to others. It will also be lower for portfolios compared to individual securities. This property of scaled pro…ts suggests that caution should be exercised in using it to make comparisons across di¤erent strategies.
To provide some minimal structure, suppose returns follow the familiar and simple one-factor model:
where i is the unconditional expected return of security i, i measures the sensitivity of security's return to the single factor, f t , and " it is the …rm-speci…c or idiosyncratic component of security i's return. Clearly, the factor is assumed to have a zero mean for simplicity,
Since the idiosyncratic component of a security's return is presumed by most to be the primary determinant of momentum pro…ts, we will make the following clarifying assumptions about its behavior:
E(" it " j; t k ) = 0 8 i 6 = j 8 k; and (7)
The assumptions above are standard and, following the literature, we allow for momentum pro…ts resulting from positive autocovariance in " it , i.e., E(" it ; " i; t k ) 6 = 0: This setup allows for the presumed prevalence of under-(or continued over-) reaction of a stock's price to …rm-speci…c events.
As indicated in (7), however, the …rm-speci…c components of any two securities are uncorrelated at all leads and lags because any correlation in the returns of two securities will result from the fact that both are a¤ected by the common factor, f t [see (8) ]. This intuition can of course be generalized to a multifactor model. In other words, there cannot be any inter-temporal relation between the …rm-speci…c components of the returns of any two securities in a well-speci…ed asset-pricing model.
The model of returns in (4)- (8) is the simplest possible characterization of returns in that the mean returns and betas of securities are constants and common movements in security prices are captured parsimoniously by a single factor. While there is evidence that the means and betas of securities may be time-dependent and a multifactor model may be a more realistic characterization of returns, the essence of our theoretical predictions and empirical design can be conveyed using the simple model in (4)- (8) . Another important reason for relying on this simple characterization of returns is that it forms the basis of most of the work on momentum strategies, including Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and hence we are not departing from the well-accepted sources of momentum pro…ts and their characterizations.
Algebraically manipulating (3) yields:
The decomposition in (9) shows that expected momentum pro…ts have two components. The average product of the holding and ranking period returns of individual securities measures the average "continuation" in the returns of individual securities, while the product of the holding and ranking period market returns measures the expected continuation in the market. Speci…cally, the …rst is simply the average of the products of current and lagged individual security returns, while the second is the product of the returns of the market in the current and lagged periods.
In other words, the momentum pro…ts measure the continued relative strength averaged across individual securities. Since we will use this decomposition later in this paper, we will denote the …rst component as the average own-products of returns of individual securities used in the strategies, and the second component will be labeled the own-product of market returns.
It nevertheless is informative to use the return generating process in (4), and recombine the components of expected momentum pro…ts given in (9) in a slightly di¤erent manner, to obtain a commonly used conceptualization of the sources of momentum pro…ts [see Conrad and Kaul (1998) , Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , Lehmann (1990) , and Lo and MacKinlay (1990)]. Speci…cally, given the behavior of security returns described in (4)- (8), expected momentum pro…ts can be decomposed as:
where
Equation (10) demonstrates why, for a given investment horizon, the momentum strategy is essentially a cross-sectional strategy -that is, in a world populated by rational investors, it is expected to produce positive pro…ts. Speci…cally, the strategy should bene…t from the cross-sectional variation in unconditional mean returns, 2 , simply because it involves systematically buying (high-mean) winners …nanced from the sale of (low-mean) losers. In fact, as is obvious from (10) and as emphasized by Conrad and Kaul (1998) , this will be the only source of momentum pro…ts if asset prices follow random walks. The second potential source of momentum pro…ts in (10) is also essentially a cross-sectional source. Although this source of pro…ts will be economically important only if the common factor is positively serially correlated so that the strategy bene…ts from market timing, the pro…ts will obtain only if there is cross-sectional variation in the betas of di¤erent securities. 5 It is only the third component of momentum pro…ts that is related to any purely time-series behavior in returns. This source of pro…ts is irrational because it is driven solely by the average positive serial covariance in the idiosyncratic components of the returns of individual securities. It is again important to emphasize that, following all previous papers, we assume that the …rm-speci…c components of any two securities are uncorrelated at all leads and lags, i.e., E(" it " j; t k ) = 0 8 i 6 = j and 8 k, because any correlation in the returns of the securities will result from the fact that both are a¤ected by the common factor, f t [see (8) ].
As indicated in the introduction, several papers have come to the conclusion that the profitability of momentum pro…ts is entirely due to serial covariance in the idiosyncratic component Rouwenhorst (1998)]. An examination of (10) shows that this conclusion is disturbing because it implies that the market is not e¢ cient. And this ine¢ ciency is nontrivial because it takes several months for readily available public information to be incorporated in prices. Furthermore, this conclusion also suggests that the expected returns and betas of all securities are the same, thus bringing into question the foundation of asset pricing in a risk-averse world.
It is clear from (10) that we are confronted with an identi…cation problem: to …gure out the relative importance of the rational versus irrational sources of momentum pro…ts, we have to specify and estimate a model for expected returns. This is because we can only observe the total realized pro…ts of momentum strategies, and not the components. That is, we can only observe the sample analog of the left-hand side of (10) , an equation that is widely used in the literature.
To decompose pro…ts using (10), however, we need to either know the "true"expected returns and risks of individual securities, or we should be able to estimate these parameters with precision.
Unfortunately, we do not know the true mean returns and risks of securities. Further, they are di¢ cult to measure because we do not have good models of expected returns and/or these models are notoriously di¢ cult to estimate using limited data on relatively long-horizon returns.
Most papers that conclude that all the pro…ts of momentum strategies arise from the serial covariance in the idiosyncratic component of security returns either estimate the mean returns and risks of securities or make an assumption about their cross-sectional variation. The most common approach is to estimate the betas of momentum strategies and, since the estimates are either zero or even marginally negative, these papers conclude that momentum has to be an anomaly. But betas are notoriously di¢ cult to estimate and fragile [see Black (1993) that momentum therefore has to be an anomaly because cross-sectional variation in mean returns and betas is assumed to be negligible within these subgroups of securities. Such an assumption again cannot be accepted at face value without an explicit demonstration that estimated betas are strongly associated with the true risk of stocks and that …rm size is strongly associated with the unconditional mean returns. Finally, while several researchers recognize that positive serial covariance in underlying factor(s) can yield momentum pro…ts, they treat this potential source of pro…tability rather casually in their studies. The general tendency is to estimate the autocovariance or autocorrelation of medium-horizon returns of the equal-weighted market portfolio over short sample periods using non-overlapping data and then to dismiss this source of pro…ts when the estimates are small positive/negative numbers [see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) ]. The problem here again is that these estimates are not only noisy but biased and negative even in randomly generated small samples precisely because the means have to be estimated [see Dixon (1944) ].
In this paper, we develop an approach to determine the relative importance of the di¤erent sources of momentum pro…ts that does not su¤er from the problems intrinsic to past studies.
Although we use (10) to intuitively understand the di¤erent sources of the pro…ts of momentum strategies, we do not attempt to estimate the di¤erent components. We bypass the need to develop a model for, or to estimate, the required returns or risks of securities by deriving a set of empirical predictions that are invariant to these parameters. Speci…cally, we implement momentum strategies based on buying and selling portfolios of securities, and focus on the pattern of the momentum pro…ts as increasingly more securities are included in the base portfolios. The key insight here is that the theoretical pattern of momentum pro…ts driven by rational price behavior will be dramatically di¤erent from that driven by irrational price behavior. Therefore, it becomes empirically refutable whether or not the …rm-speci…c news is the sole driver for the pro…tability of momentum strategies.
Strategies Using Portfolios of Securities
Consider momentum strategies that trade portfolios of stocks containing an increasingly large number of securities. As in the case of single-security strategy, we determine the relative strength of these portfolios by comparing their past performance to the market and implement a set of momentum strategies by buying winner portfolios and selling loser portfolios in proportion to their relative strength.
Speci…cally, consider a market with N stocks and a momentum strategy using portfolios, each of which consists of exactly n individual stocks. Without loss of generality, assume that N can be evenly divided by n so that the momentum strategy uses N=n base portfolios. We focus on the equal-weighting scheme for the base portfolio returns as well as the momentum portfolio return, so that:
where r p; t 1
The portfolio-based strategy in (11) is similar to the individual-security strategy re ‡ected in (1); both are zero-cost strategies and both classify an asset into the winner or loser category based on the past performance relative to the market. There is a critical di¤erence between the two, however. Equation (1) cannot be used to determine the relative importance of di¤erent sources of momentum pro…ts without specifying and estimating a speci…c model of expected returns. The use of (11) with increasing number of securities in the base portfolios, however, allows us to bypass the need to specify a model of expected returns. We can determine the relative importance of the sources of momentum pro…ts by instead focusing on the pattern of pro…ts of portfolio strategies as the size of the base portfolios is increased.
To understand the bene…ts of using portfolios in implementing momentum strategies, it is useful to evaluate the expected pro…ts to portfolio momentum strategies:
E(r pt r p; t 1 ) E(r mt r m; t 1 ):
The expected pro…ts of portfolio strategies are equal to the di¤erence between the average expected continuation in the returns of the base portfolios and the expected continuation in the market returns or, equivalently, the di¤erence between the own-products of the returns of the base and market portfolios. A comparison of (9) and (12) shows an identical second term in both, the expected continuation of the market returns, because we are always assessing the relative strength of either individual securities or portfolios with respect to the market. Consequently, we will focus on the pattern in the …rst term of (12), the expected average continuation in portfolio returns, relative to the …rst term in (9), the expected average continuation in individual-security returns.
There are two types of return products that a¤ect the average expected continuation in the returns of the base portfolios: the own-products of the holding and ranking period returns of a speci…c stock, and the cross-products between the holding period return of one stock and the ranking period return of another stock. It is important to realize that the continuation in the returns of the base portfolios is a¤ected by the cross-products of the returns of securities only within the same portfolios, not any pair of securities in the universe. As the number of securities in the base portfolios is increased, the own-products of individual security returns will contribute less to the momentum pro…ts. At the same time, however, there will be a geometric increase in the cross-products within the base portfolios that will contribute to the momentum pro…ts. Whether these cross-products strengthen or weaken the pro…tability of momentum strategies depends on how the base portfolios are formed in the …rst place, as there are potentially an in…nite number of ways to do so.
We demonstrate below that a carefully designed method of grouping individual stocks into the base portfolios will generate distinctly di¤erent patterns in pro…ts depending on whether rational or irrational price dynamics are the source of momentum. Speci…cally, we consider two ways of combining the stocks into portfolios. The …rst method is to form portfolios randomly. The second method is to combine securities by their rank ordering based on past performance, just as in the case of the traditional momentum strategy. In this new implementation, however, the n strongest winners (or losers) are grouped together into one base portfolio, the next n winners (or losers) in the order of their past relative strength into another, and so on. We show that the …rst method of forming portfolios randomly cannot help us distinguish between the rational and irrational sources of momentum pro…ts because both sources lead to an identical pattern in pro…ts with increasing n. Conversely, however, the second method of forming portfolios using the rank ordering of stocks based on their past performance leads to distinctly di¤erent patterns in pro…ts with increasing n depending on the underlying source(s).
In order to devise a model-free method to determine the sources of pro…ts, we need to examine the momentum in more detail. In the Appendix we show that expected pro…ts to the individualsecurity and the portfolio-based momentum strategies can be written, respectively, as:
where the overline " " denotes averages of the parameters, and the superscripts "ALL" and "PORT " denote the averages are for all securities in the universe and securities within base portfolios, respectively. 6 The important common feature of (13) and (14) is that both pro…ts can be decomposed into the same rational and irrational components. The …rst terms in both expressions denote pro…ts from the cross-sectional variation in the unconditional mean returns, albeit of individual securities versus portfolios. Similarly, the second terms denote any pro…tability due to cross-sectional variation in the betas of individual securities versus portfolios, which will be economically relevant only if the common factor, f t , has any serial correlation. Finally, only the last terms of both (13) and (14) re ‡ect the contributions of the irrational component caused by any mispricing due to …rm-speci…c news.
The main di¤erence between (13) and (14), however, is key to generating testable predictions that help distinguish between the rational versus irrational sources of momentum pro…ts without requiring the speci…cation and estimation of a model of expected returns. Note that the portfolio formation process, with an increasing number of securities in the portfolios, has very di¤erent implications for the …rst two versus the third components. The expected pro…ts of single-security momentum strategies in (13) are determined entirely by the own-products and cross-products of all securities in the universe. On the other hand, the pro…tability of portfolio momentum strategies in (14) due to rational sources is increasingly a¤ected by the weighted average cross-products of the unconditional means and the betas of all pairs of securities in the base portfolios. Speci…cally, the portfolio diversi…cation process reduces the importance of the weighted own-products of both the unconditional means and the betas decline at the rate of
with an increase in the size of the base portfolios, but the importance of the corresponding cross-products increases. From (14) it therefore follows that the pattern in the pro…tability of portfolio momentum strategies using increasing number of securities will be determined entirely by the behavior of the weighted average cross-products of the means and betas of securities in the base portfolios, n 1 n i j P ORT and n 1 n i j P ORT , respectively, relative to the average cross-products of all securities in the universe, i j ALL and i j ALL . If we can combine securities with similar mean returns and betas into each base portfolio, the pro…tability of the portfolio momentum strategies could remain invariant to the size of the portfolios.
Conversely, and importantly, the portfolio formation process will have a starkly di¤erent e¤ect on any pro…ts generated by the mispricing of securities caused by delayed reactions or continued overreactions to …rm-speci…c news. Similar to the e¤ects of the portfolio diversi…cation process on the importance of both the own-products of the unconditional means and betas, the own-product of the idiosyncratic component of returns also declines at the rate of 1 n with the size of the base portfolios. There however is no compensating e¤ect due to cross-products because …rm-speci…c components of any two securities cannot be correlated with each other at any leads or lags, i.e., E(" it " j; t k ) = 0 8 i 6 = j and 8 k. Consequently, the pro…ts of portfolio momentum strategies will shrink at the speed of 1 n ;regardless of the manner in which individual securities are combined into base portfolios.
As mentioned above, we use two methods to combine securities into portfolios. The …rst method combines securities randomly into base portfolios. From (14) and the above discussion it is clear that any contribution to the pro…tability of momentum strategies due to continuation in the idiosyncratic components of stock returns will decline at the rate of 1 n ; where n is the number of securities included in the portfolio. It however turns out that the average cross-products within base portfolios will converge to the average cross-products of all securities in the universe, that is, i j P ORT = i j ALL and i j P ORT = i j ALL , thus leading to decline at the rate of 1 n in any pro…ts generated by rational sources as well. Therefore,
In other words, the method of forming portfolios randomly fails to provide any testable predictions that enable us to distinguish between rational and irrational sources of pro…ts. This occurs because expected momentum pro…ts will decline at the rate of 1 n regardless of whether the rational or irrational causes are at play. This method nevertheless serves as an important robustness check of our methodology.
Our second method of forming the base portfolios …rst ranks securities based on their individual past performance, and then combines them into portfolios before classifying them as winner and loser portfolios relative to the market. When securities with adjacent ranks of prior performance are grouped into the same base portfolio, the average cross products within base portfolios will converge to the average own-products of all securities in the universe, i.e., . This occurs because, in the absence of observing the true unconditional mean returns and risks, the ranking of stocks based on past returns will on average mimic their ranking based on the unobservable unconditional mean returns and risks. This is likely to be the case especially for momentum strategies with portfolios containing a small number of stocks because a smaller set of adjacent stocks ranked based on their past performance are likely to have similar mean returns and risks. Hence, the expected momentum pro…ts from using portfolios with such features can be written as:
The formation of portfolios using the rank ordering of individual securities based on their past relative strength has two interesting consequences: there is no "diversi…cation e¤ect" for small n for the "systematic" component of momentum pro…ts, whereas the idiosyncratic component of momentum pro…ts is reduced at the rate of 1 n . As n is increased, stocks with increasingly di¤erent mean returns and betas will be grouped together and thus the cross-products will tend to become smaller relative to the own-products, leading to a decline in the average cross-products, i j P ORT and i j P ORT . This decline will initially be balanced by a larger weight of n 1
n . Even when n becomes very large, however, the expected pro…ts will not converge to zero because, if there is any cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns and betas of individual securities, i j P ORT > i j ALL and i j P ORT > i j ALL [see (14) ]. 7 The methodology of implementing portfolio momentum strategies using the rank ordering of securities based on their past relative strength has some appealing properties. First, this design provides very distinct testable predictions to distinguish between the di¤erent sources of momentum pro…ts. If, as most studies have concluded, irrational price movements are the sole (or predominant) cause of momentum, the pro…ts of these strategies will decline at the rate of 1 n to zero when portfolios of increasing number of securities are used to implement momentum strategies. [That is, i = j and i = j for all i 6 = j and only the third term of (16) matters.] Conversely, however, if cross-sectional variation in expected returns and risks is the primary source of momentum, these strategies may witness pro…ts that remain unaltered as the number of securities in the portfolios is increased. [That is, the third term of (16) drops out entirely.] Although pro…ts will decrease as the number of securities in the portfolios, n , becomes very large, they will not converge to zero. The most appealing aspect of these portfolio strategies is that we do not need to form large portfolios to be able to distinguish between the rational and irrational components and determine their relative importance. In fact, the sharpest hypotheses tests obtain for portfolios containing a small number of securities. For example, with only two securities in a portfolio, if irrational continuation in the idiosyncratic component of returns is the only source of pro…ts, the expected momentum pro…ts will be 1 2 the pro…ts of the traditional single-security momentum strategy. Conversely, there is likely to be no decline in the pro…tability of the strategy if rational cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks of individual securities is the only source(s). This follows because two securities ranked based on their past performance are, on average, likely to have very similar mean returns and risks.
The second aspect of the empirical design is that it involves examining the pattern of momentum pro…ts with respect to the portfolio size, without conducting any decomposition of momentum pro…ts. All that is required is the implementation of a set of portfolio-based momentum strategies.
These portfolios need to have increasing number of securities, but they are formed using the same set of stocks that are used in the commonly-implemented single-security momentum strategy. Our tests therefore e¤ectively bypass the need to specify and estimate a model of expected returns. This aspect of our tests is not only novel, but it will also help us reach conclusions that are una¤ected by estimation errors and biases present in previous studies.
Finally, although the autocovariance in the common factor, f t , has the potential of altering the level of expected momentum pro…ts for all n, the empirical veri…cation of the pro…t pattern with increasing n does not depend upon the magnitude or the sign of the autocovariance of the factor.
We cannot determine whether time-series correlation in the factor contributes to the rational component, but we can, with precision, determine whether irrational continuation in the idiosyncratic components of individual security returns contributes to momentum pro…ts.
Empirical Evidence
In implementing the momentum strategies, we include all stocks on the New York and American stock exchanges (NYSE/AMEX) between 1926 and 2006 and, following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we focus on the six-month investment horizon. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a six-month ranking period, and then compared to a benchmark return (either equal-weighted or value-weighted market return) so as to separate winners from losers. 8 The proceeds from selling losers are used to buy winners, with the extreme winners and losers receiving highest weights [see (1) for the equal-weighted strategy]. The resulting portfolio is held for the subsequent six-month holding period, and the momentum pro…t is computed based on the compounded returns for individual stocks during the holding period. If a stock drops out of our sample during the holding period, we include its compounded return for the months that it survives in the holding period. This procedure is repeated on a rolling basis for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts ranges from July, 1926 to June, 2006.
We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods in order to mitigate the e¤ects of market microstructure biases that have been frequently emphasized in the literature. We also repeat the entire exercise without skipping one month, and the pattern of results is qualitatively similar. Although there is attenuation in the pro…tability of the strategies conducted over the entire sample period, consistent with the results in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) In this paper, the momentum strategies are executed based using individual stocks and portfolios. For the single-security strategy, each winner/loser consists of only one stock, and the description above su¢ ces. For portfolio-based strategies, each winner/loser is a portfolio of n stocks that is formed based on certain attributes during the ranking period. We consequently also need to compute the portfolio returns using the compounded individual stock returns during the ranking and holding periods. The relative performance of the portfolio returns during the ranking period a¤ects both the determination of winners versus losers and the weights for the momentum strategies. In both the single-security and portfolio strategies, the benchmark return for the ranking period is calculated from the compounded returns of all the individual stocks in the population. Table 1 Since this is a "return" on a zero-investment strategy, we also provide estimates of the investment long/short in the strategy that, on average, amounts to $0.094. The scaled pro…t per dollar investment long/short is 4.38% over a six-month period, which translates to an annualized return close to 9%.
The Robustness and Consistency of Momentum Pro…ts
This estimate is similar to the estimates reported in the literature, although most studies implement the momentum strategies over the post-1962 period. Not surprisingly therefore the subperiod estimates of the average pro…ts are also consistently statistically and economically signi…cant.
The point estimates range between 0:284 10 2 during 1946-1966 to 0:549 10 2 during the most recent 20-year period. Since there is variation in the level of investment long/short, the return per dollar long also varies between 2.82% and 5.48%. These estimates not only verify the consistency and robustness of the momentum strategy over an 80-year period, they also translate into substantial annualized returns between 5.7% and 11.3%. And, interestingly, the most pro…table period spans the 20 years after the discovery of the strategy by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) .
Given the robustness of the momentum strategy over time, it appears natural to also test its robustness across di¤erent types of stocks. This is especially important because Titman (1993, 2001) claim that the strategy is consistently pro…table across stocks of di¤erent market values. They arrive at this conclusion by implementing the strategy within market-valuebased categories of stocks. This however is not the same as evaluating the importance of di¤erent types of stocks in determining the pro…tability of the momentum strategy applied to all stocks.
To gauge whether …rms of di¤erent size play a di¤erent role in determining momentum pro…ts, we instead conduct a simple test. We implement a value-weighted momentum strategy with the weight in (1) is replaced by
where v i; t 1 is the relative market-value of security i at time t-1, and r m; t 1 is the value-weighted market return. 9 This strategy is also a zero-investment strategy, yet it allows us to evaluate the importance of di¤erent types of …rms in determining momentum pro…ts.
The average estimates of the pro…tability of the value-weighted momentum strategy are provided for the overall period and the four sub-periods in Panel B of Table 1 , with the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. The most immediate and noteworthy aspect of the pro…t estimates is that they are dramatically lower than the estimates for the equal- The estimates in Table 1 , Panel B, convey a simple and obvious message: …rm-size has a major role to play in the momentum phenomenon. This evidence is contrary to the evidence in Titman (1993, 2001 ), but is consistent with the …ndings of Hong, Lim, and
Stein (2000) who argue that momentum is related to …rm-size when the smallest-sized …rms are excluded from the strategies. We believe that the evidence in Table 1 , Panel B, though admittedly preliminary, is suggestive of a rational explanation for the success of equal-weighted momentum strategies implemented in the literature. Note that the decomposition of the expected momentum pro…ts in (10) shows that cross-sectional variation in required returns and risks will contribute to these pro…ts. The expected momentum pro…ts of the value-weighted strategy should therefore be substantially lower than the commonly implemented equal-weighted strategies because the valueweighted cross-sectional variation in mean returns and betas should be lower. This is because small …rms that tend to have higher average returns and risks get much lower weights in this strategy. The results in Table 1 assume that there is no rebalancing during the holding period.
Expected Returns or Firm-Speci…c Under-(or Continued Over-) reaction?
To distinguish between the rational versus irrational/behavioral sources of momentum, we conduct the portfolio-based tests outlined in Section 2. We …rst present evidence for portfolio strategies that combine securities rank ordered based on their past performance because they provide distinctly di¤erent predictions for the two sources of pro…ts. Evidence based on the random portfolio strategies are then presented as part of robustness checks of our methodology. Speci…cally, individual stocks that have already been categorized into winners and losers based on their relative performance during the ranking period are now combined into base portfolios of size n by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time from each category. The strongest n winner stocks are grouped in the …rst winner portfolio; the next n winner stocks are grouped in the next winner portfolio; repeating this procedure until all winner stocks are part of some winner portfolio. Similarly, the strongest n loser stocks are grouped in one loser portfolio; the next n loser stocks are grouped in another loser portfolio; and so on. 10 Table 2 , Panel A, contains estimates of the pro…tability of portfolio momentum strategies conducted using the same set of ranked securities that are used in the single-security strategy reported in Table 1 . We also report the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. From the detailed analysis presented in Section 2, recall that the two alternative sources of momentum pro…ts have distinctly di¤erent implications for the pro…tability of these portfolio strategies. If …rm-speci…c news leads to momentum in returns, the average pro…ts of equal-weighted portfolio strategies should decline at the rate of 1 n , and eventually to zero, as the number of securities included in the portfolios (n) is increased. Conversely, however, if the ranking of securities signals di¤erences in their expected returns and risks, the pro…ts of the portfolio strategies are likely to remain the same for small n . And even for very large n , the pro…ts should remain economically and statistically greater than zero. For purposes of our tests, we choose portfolios of sizes ranging between two and 50. Although we can test the predictions of our tests with just a few securities in a portfolio, for completeness we include as many as 50 securities in the portfolios. By limiting the maximum size of portfolios to 50 securities, however, we ensure that a reasonable number of winner/loser portfolios can be formed for implementing the trading strategies.
The estimates of the average pro…tability of the portfolio strategies reported in Table 2 , Panel A, provide compelling evidence in favor of a rational story for the success of momentum strategies.
There is no evidence in support of the widely held belief that momentum is an anomaly driven solely (or predominantly) by the under-(or continued over-) reaction to …rm-speci…c news. For the overall period, the average estimates of the equal-weighted momentum pro…ts do not decrease with 1 0 Note that the last winner/loser portfolios may contain less than n stocks, and the stocks in these two portfolios have returns fairly close to the benchmark return. Our results remain unchanged if we exclude these stocks from our strategies by requiring all base portfolios to include exactly n stocks during the ranking period. Base portfolios with unbalanced size can also occur when stocks that are present in the ranking period drop out of the sample during the holding period. We …nd that requiring exactly n stocks in both the ranking and holding periods also does not alter our results.
n. In fact, the estimates for all values of n are statistically indistinguishable from 0:417 10 2 , the average pro…t for the overall period reported in Table 1, Panel A (and also in the …rst row   of Table 2 , Panel A). One simple, yet powerful, way to evaluate the implications of the evidence is to consider the pro…tability of the portfolio with only two securities (i.e., n = 2) because the predictions of the two alternative hypotheses are starkly di¤erent. If irrational price continuation is the only source of pro…ts the average pro…ts for n = 2 should be An additional appealing aspect of momentum strategies that use portfolios combining securities based on their past ranked returns is that the investment estimates provided in Table 2 , Panel B, are identical across the di¤erent-sized portfolios within each period. This is not surprising because we always combine winners with other winners, and losers with other losers, in forming the portfolios.
Thus the expected value of the investment, see (2), has to be identical for all portfolios within a particular period. This property of the investment outlays has the advantage of allowing us to use the scaled momentum pro…ts to test whether momentum is a rational or an idiosyncratic phenomenon. Panel C again shows that under-(or continued over-) reaction to idiosyncratic news cannot have any role in generating momentum pro…ts. Consistent with cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks of securities, the average scaled pro…t estimates stay statistically unchanged with an increase in the number of securities included in the portfolios. There is a very slow decline in scaled pro…ts during 1926-1946, but the pro…ts of the largest portfolio (with n = 50) are still statistically indistinguishable from the scaled pro…ts of the traditional momentum strategies. In any event, even the point estimate average scaled pro…ts for n = 50 is more than 75% of the scaled pro…ts of the single-security strategy, which is much higher than the 2% predicted by the irrational hypothesis.
Although the precise predictions of our tests presented in Section 2 are directly applicable to equal-weighted portfolio strategies presented in Table 2 , for completeness we also execute valueweighted portfolio strategies. Both average estimates and the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics for these strategies are reported in Table 3 . The evidence again provides strong support for the rational explanation of the momentum phenomenon. In stark contrast to the prediction of the irrational hypothesis for momentum, the average pro…ts remain statistically unchanged when an increasingly large number of securities are included in the base portfolios. In fact, even during 1926-1946 there is no attenuation in the pro…tability of the momentum strategy even for large n, a pattern witnessed in estimates of both the average pro…ts and the scaled average pro…ts.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, all the tests reported in Tables 2 and 3 maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding six-month periods to attenuate any market microstructure biases.
We have also repeated the entire battery of tests without skipping one month, and the pattern of our results is qualitatively similar. This is in contrast to the Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) industry explanation for the success of the six-month momentum strategy, which is quite sensitive to the potential microstructure biases present in the data [see Grundy and Martin (2001) ]. This suggests that common factor(s) unrelated to industry a¢ liation of securities appear to be the main cause of the success of momentum strategies.
We believe that the major advantage of the tests presented in Tables 2 and 3 is that they do not depend on a speci…c model of expected returns and, more importantly, they do not call for the estimation of the components of momentum pro…ts. As mentioned earlier, in an attempt to determine the pro…t sources of momentum strategies all past studies have instead attempted to estimate decompositions similar to the one in (10) . Unfortunately, apart from the fact that we do not have a theoretically-grounded model of expected returns, estimation of even unconditional means, covariances, and variances are all subject to small-sample biases [see, for example, Black (1993) and Merton (1980) ].
We believe that the results in Tables 2 and 3 are compelling on their own but, for completeness, in the sections that follow we present a more detailed analysis of the pro…ts of the portfolio strategies. We also provide some robustness checks to convince the skeptical reader that there is no momentum arising from the …rm speci…c components of returns.
A Detailed Analysis of Momentum Pro…ts
We show in Section 2 that momentum strategies trading portfolios of securities that are grouped based on the rank ordering of their past performance will remain pro…table if cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks is the main source of pro…ts. This prediction is con…rmed by the average pro…t estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3 . In this section, we present the individualsecurity return dynamics underlying this pattern to show that momentum cannot be driven by continuation in the …rm-speci…c component of returns. The dynamics is instead consistent only with cross-sectional variation in required returns and risks of securities. Speci…cally, and as shown theoretically in Section 2, the average pro…ts of portfolio momentum strategies will remain unchanged because the declining pro…t contribution by the own-products of individual securities will be o¤set by the additional pro…t attributed to the cross-products within the base portfolios [see (13) and (14)]. If the ranking of past returns re ‡ects di¤erences in mean returns and risks, and at least some stocks have similar mean returns and risks, the average pro…ts will remain largely unchanged for small n: Even as n becomes large, the cross-products of the securities in the base portfolios remain larger than the own-product of the market portfolio which, in turn, re ‡ects the average cross-products of the returns of the entire population of securities. If the factor is serially uncorrelated, from (14) it implies that i j P ORT > i j ALL .
To evaluate the sources of momentum pro…ts, in Table 4 , Panels A and B, we present the weighted average own-and cross-products of the returns of securities within the base portfolios that are used to implement the equal-weighted strategies. Since the un-weighted average crossproducts within the base portfolios play an important role in distinguishing between the distinctly di¤erent dynamics of average pro…ts in a rational versus irrational world, we report them in Panel C. These are simple transformations of the weighted average cross-products reported in Panel B
[see (14)], and the two series converge for large n. Panel D contains average estimates of the own-product of the market return, which re ‡ect the average cross-products of all securities in the universe. Note that, unlike past studies, we do not decompose pro…ts as in (10) . Although such an exercise would increase our understanding of the sources of momentum pro…ts, it will be plagued by model misspeci…cation and estimation errors, thus rendering any inferences unreliable. We instead analyze own-and cross-products of security returns because they do not require the estimation of mean returns and hence do not su¤er from small-sample biases [see …rst parts of (13) and (14)]. Before we analyze the evidence in Table 4 , it may help to explain the various estimates, and their relation to average pro…ts. From (14) , and focusing for convenience only on the …rst bracket, average pro…ts of any strategy will have three components: the average estimate of the own products within a base portfolio ( that classi…es individual securities into winners and losers, that is, for n = 1, the average pro…t of 0:417 10 2 for the overall period (see Table 1 , Panel A) is the average estimate of the ownproducts, 1:239 10 2 , reported in the …rst row of Table 4 , Panel A, less the average own-product of the market, 0:810 10 2 , shown in Panel D. 11 Note that for this strategy by construction there are no cross-products within the portfolio, and hence all estimates in the …rst row of Panels B and C are zero.
To gauge whether the estimates in Table 4 are consistent with a rational explanation, it is again instructive to evaluate the evidence for n = 2, the portfolio strategy with the fewest number of securities in each portfolio, and compare it to the traditional momentum strategy that evaluates individual securities. For n = 2, the average of the own-products of individual security returns is reduced by 50% to 0:620 10 2 (see second row of Panel A), but this reduction is compensated fully by the weighted average cross-products among the securities in the portfolios, 0:653 10 2 (see …rst row of Panel B). The most important aspect of the results in Table 4 is that the di¤ erence between the sum of the weighted average own-and cross-products of the securities within the base portfolios and the weighted average cross-products for all securities in the universe is maintained, The estimates for strategies using portfolios with two securities is not only inconsistent with the irrational explanation widely accepted in the profession, but it also shows that price continuation due to …rm-speci…c news has no role to play in determining momentum pro…ts. For n = 2, both the rational and the irrational hypotheses predict that the average estimate of the own products of returns in the portfolios will drop by 50% to 0:620 10 2 . The estimates in Panel A alone therefore cannot help us distinguish between the rational and irrational explanations unless, like previous studies, we specify and estimate a model for the required returns of individual securities to enable us to attribute the 50% drop to either the rational or irrational sources.
The methodology introduced in this paper bypasses this potentially slippery step, yet helps us distinguish between, and determine the relative importance of, the rational versus irrational explanations. The key to our ability to do this lies in the behavior of the un-weighted average cross-products within the base portfolios, reported in Table 4 , Panel C, relative to the average crossproducts of all securities in the universe shown in Panel D. 12 If momentum is caused by under-(or over-) reaction to …rm-speci…c news, the un-weighted average of the cross-products within the base portfolios reported in Panel C of Table 4 will be equal to the average cross-products of all securities in the universe in Panel D for all n, including n = 2. This will obtain because the un-weighted average cross-products within the base portfolios cannot be a¤ected by any price continuations due to …rm-speci…c news and any cross-sectional variation in mean returns is ruled out by construction [see (15) ]. Inconsistent with the irrational hypothesis, the un-weighted average cross-products 1 1 The minor di¤erence is the result of the fact that some securities in the ranking period drop out of the holding period which, in turn, a¤ects the estimates presented in Table 4 . 1 2 Each base portfolio consists of n stocks and thus produces n(n 1) cross-products of returns. Taking the average of all such cross-products across all the N=n base portfolios, we get the measure reported in Panel C of Table 4 . This measure is called un-weighted because once we multiply it by the (n 1)=n factor (i.e., the weight) we arrive at the weighted average cross-products that are reported in Panel B of Table 4 . See (14) .
within the base portfolios containing only two securities is 1:306 10 2 , which is much higher than the average cross-products of all securities in the universe, 0:810 10 2 . Importantly, the un-weighted average cross-products are very similar in magnitude to (and, in fact, slightly higher than) the average own-products, thus ruling out the possibility of any price continuations due to …rm-speci…c news. Equivalently, this evidence suggests that cross-sectional variation in required returns and risks of securities are solely responsible for generating momentum pro…ts.
As the number of securities in the portfolios of winners/losers increases, the own-products of the securities become less important, while the cross-products play an increasing role in contributing to the momentum pro…ts. Even for n = 50, the average of the weighted and un-weighted crossproducts (which are quite similar at 1:222 10 2 and 1:247 10 2 ) remain very close to the average of the own-products of the individual securities, 1:239 10 2 , and thus substantially greater than the estimated own-product of the market return of 0:810 10 2 . Thus, it is not surprising that the average pro…tability of the portfolio momentum strategies remains unchanged even with a fairly large number of securities in each portfolio. This again is inconsistent with momentum being driven, to any measurable degree, by under-(or continued over-) reaction of stock prices to …rm-speci…c news.
As can be expected, the cross-sectional variation in expected returns and risks are likely to vary over time. Consequently, it is not surprising that the pro…tability of momentum strategies reported in Table 1 , Panel A, varies over the di¤erent sub-periods. In each of the four sub-periods, however, the behavior of the average own-and cross-products within the base portfolios mimics the pattern in the overall period. Speci…cally, when there are a few securities in each portfolio, the systematic decline in the importance of own-products is fully compensated by the cross-products within base portfolios, thus maintaining the pro…tability of the momentum strategies. This occurs because for small n the un-weighted average cross-products within the base portfolios (see Panel C) are much larger than the average cross-products for the entire universe of securities (see Panel D). And even when the portfolios contain a fairly large number of securities, the average estimates of the weighted and un-weighted cross-products remain economically and statistically greater than estimates of the own-products of the market (compare the last row of Panel B with C to Panel D). Again it is the di¤erence between these two average estimates that ensures the pro…tability of the momentum strategies that contain even 50 securities in each portfolio, though it is important to remember that these securities are ranked based on their past performance before they are combined into portfolios. Hence, there is no evidence of irrational behavior in stock prices in any sub-period.
Before we present a …nal set of robustness tests to con…rm our conclusions, a few comments about our methodology relative to past studies are in order. Previous studies do not analyze crossproducts, but instead attempt to estimate serial covariances and correlations of the factor(s). For example, studies …nd that the serial covariance and correlation of the equal-weighted market are small negative numbers in the post-war period [see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Lewellen (2002) , and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) ]. As our analysis in Sections 2 and 3 hopefully establishes, in order to determine whether momentum is an anomaly caused by under-(or continued over-) reaction to …rm-speci…c news, there is no need to determine whether the factor is positively autocorrelated or not. This follows because any such autocorrelation will matter only if the risks of di¤erent securities are measurably di¤erent, and any such cross-sectional variance in risks is a rational phenomenon. In any event, unlike own-and cross-products, estimates of serial covariances and correlations of returns are biased in small samples because mean returns need to be estimated.
Although we will refrain from estimating the means, covariances, and autocovariances of even the return on the market portfolio, it may nevertheless be informative to get an idea of whether the time-series dynamics of factor(s) contribute to the pro…tability of momentum strategies. This is only important because the cross-sectional variation in unconditional mean returns always contributes to the pro…tability of momentum strategies, while the autocovariance in the factor(s) may exaggerate or attenuate the pro…ts depending on whether it is positive or negative [see the decompositions in (13) and (14)]. At least for the overall period, where we have a reasonably large sample of overlapping six-month returns, our average estimate of the market's own-product suggests that the factor(s) are likely to have contributed to the pro…tability of momentum strategies. Speci…cally, the average estimate of the market's own-product is 0.810, which would imply a positive serial covariance in the factor unless the annualized mean return for the market was greater than 18% during 1926-2006! 13 Tables 2, 3 , and 4 contain compelling evidence that cross-sectional variation in expected returns and risks is the dominant source of the pro…tability of momentum strategies. The tables con…rm the prediction developed in Section 2 that if past relative performance is indicative of di¤erences in mean returns and risks, momentum strategies trading portfolios of past winners and losers should continue to remain pro…table. The tables lend no support for the notion that momentum pro…ts are solely (or predominantly) attributable to …rm-speci…c news. The evidence is inconsistent with the prediction that if past performance is a signal of future continuation in …rm-speci…c returns, the pro…ts of these portfolio strategies should decline at the rate of 1 n to zero with an increase in the size of the portfolios.
A Robustness Check
In Section 2 we show that if securities are combined randomly into portfolios, the diversi…cation e¤ect leads to an identical speed of shrinkage of pro…ts from both the systematic and the idiosyncratic components of returns. To examine if the corresponding momentum pro…ts decrease at the rate of 1 n and approach zero, we implement momentum strategies using portfolios of securities combined randomly from the entire population. Speci…cally, we generate a uniform random number for each stock present in a ranking period, and sort stocks by the magnitude of the random number. 1 3 This is inconsistent with the negative estimates of the autocorrelation and autocovariance presented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) , partly because these parameters are downward biased especially in their much smaller post-1962 samples.
Base portfolios of size n are then formed by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time; the n stocks with the largest random numbers are grouped in one base portfolio, the next n stocks in another base portfolio, repeating this procedure until all stocks are assigned to portfolios. 14 Then holding the set of uniform random numbers …xed, we form base portfolios of size n + 1 by sequentially picking o¤ n + 1 stocks at a time, and so on.
If continuation in the idiosyncratic component of returns is the sole (or predominant) reason for the pro…tability of momentum strategies, the pro…ts of these strategies will again decline at the rate of 1 n [see (15) ]. As in the case of the portfolios based on relative strength, this will occur because the …rm-speci…c components of two securities cannot be correlated with each other over time. However, contrary to portfolios based on relative strength, even if cross-sectional variation in expected returns and risks is the source of the pro…tability of momentum strategies, pro…ts of these random portfolio strategies will also decline at the rate of 1 n to zero for very large portfolios. The di¤erence in pro…t patterns arises from the fact that, unlike the relative strength portfolio strategies, the random portfolio strategies in this experiment fail to maintain the cross-sectional variation in mean returns and risks. By combining securities randomly into portfolios we generate a level of average cross-products within portfolios that is close to the average cross-products for all securities, and the diversi…cation e¤ect forces the systematic component of returns to shrink at the speed of 1 n . Consequently, the expected pro…ts of the random portfolio strategies should exhibit a dramatically di¤erent pattern than the one exhibited both theoretically and empirically by portfolios created from securities ranked based on their past relative strength.
The tests based on the equal-weighted random portfolios are presented in Table 5 . 15 Panel A reports average pro…ts for portfolios of di¤erent sizes and, for convenience, we also report the pro…ts of the single-security strategy in the …rst row. To gauge the statistical signi…cance of the various average estimates, we present the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics.
Consistent with the prediction of the experimental design, the estimated pro…ts in the overall period decline at the rate of 1 n . A similar pattern can be witnessed during each sub-period. This is in stark contrast to the pro…ts of momentum strategies that use portfolios of securities based on their past relative strength (see Table 3 , Panel A). The comparison of the estimates in Panels A of Tables 3 and 5 con…rms that the pro…tability of momentum strategies reported in the literature is due to the cross-sectional variation in the systematic component of security returns because that is the only di¤erence between the two sets of portfolios used in these di¤erent strategies. Table 5 , Panel B reports the average investment involved in the strategies. Note that within each sample period, the average investment estimates decline with n, which is in contrast to the unchanged estimates of investments in Panel B of Table 3 . This however is not surprising because, unlike the strategies with portfolios grouped using securities rank ordered based on past performance, in this experiment the securities are combined randomly into portfolios. It can be shown that the expected investment, since it is based on the absolute deviations of individual-security returns from the return of the equal-weighted market portfolio [see (2) ], will decline with n in these portfolios. An unintended consequence of this decline is that the scaled momentum pro…ts decline at a slower rate than predicted by the set up of the experiment, which again demonstrates that the scaling process is not innocuous. As mentioned earlier, caution needs to be exercised in using scaled pro…ts to make comparisons across di¤erent trading strategies. Table 6 contains estimated average own-and cross-products of the randomly generated base portfolios to shed light on the dynamics of these momentum strategies, with the corresponding heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. Not surprisingly, Panel A of Table 6 is identical to Panel A of Table 4 because the individual securities that form the basis of both sets of strategies are identical. As before, Panel A shows that the importance of average own-products declines at the rate of 1 n . This also con…rms that the average estimates of the own-products cannot help distinguish between alternate sources of momentum pro…ts. The interesting aspect of Table 6 again lies in the behavior of the un-weighted average cross-products of the portfolios in Panel C, relative to the average cross-products of all securities in the entire universe (see Panel D). Recall that the average pro…ts will decline with n for the random portfolios and, unlike the portfolios containing securities rank ordered based on their past performance, the pro…ts will not remain unaltered. This will occur even for small n because the averages of the un-weighted cross-products within the base portfolios will converge to the average cross-products of all securities in the sample.
A comparison of the estimates in Panels C and D of Table 6 shows that even for n = 2 the average estimate of the un-weighted cross-products within the portfolio ( 0:867 10 2 ) is very close to, and statistically indistinguishable from, the average estimate of the cross-products of all securities in the universe ( 0:810 10 2 ). Since the average of the un-weighted cross-products within the base portfolios remain roughly the same with an increase in the size of the portfolios, the average pro…ts of the momentum strategies decline at the rate of 1 n to zero. Consequently, the lack of crosssectional variation in expected returns and risks of the portfolios of randomly combined securities eventually leads to a lack of pro…tability of the strategies for reasonably large n.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a new methodology to test whether momentum is indeed an anomaly.
Our methodology is unique in that it bypasses the need to specify and estimate a speci…c model of expected returns. More importantly, it does not require a decomposition of momentum pro…ts, a process that has riddled past studies with model speci…cation and estimation problems. Our methodology and tests are based instead on the appealing logic and intuition of the simple observation that repeated ranking of stocks based on their relative strength should have some relation with the expected returns and risks of the securities used in the strategies. And using portfolios of stocks with similar rank ordering based on their past performance versus randomly chosen stocks should help us distinguish between the rational and irrational sources of momentum pro…ts.
We believe that a secondary and reassuring contribution of our paper is that we present compelling evidence that momentum is not an anomaly. More speci…cally, there is no evidence that under-(or continued over-) reaction to …rm-speci…c news is the cause for the remarkable and continued success of momentum strategies at intermediate horizons. On the contrary, momentum appears to be a perfectly understandable phenomenon in a world in which di¤erent securities have di¤erent expected returns and risks. Our results are reassuring because if momentum were to arise solely or predominantly from irrational serial covariance in the …rm-speci…c components of returns, it would not only violate market e¢ ciency in its weakest form but also bring into question the reasonable belief that individuals are risk-averse and therefore demand a (rather large?) risk premium.
Our main goal in this paper is to address the important issue of whether momentum is an anomaly or not. We therefore have not tried to determine the sources of the seasonal patterns in momentum. Speci…cally, we have not addressed why momentum is not present in the DecemberJanuary part of the year. We believe that this variation within the year is not the main part of the momentum puzzle and convincing evidence based on tax-loss selling has already been presented by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) to explain the seasonality. Another important issue that is not addressed in this paper is the apparent reversal of the momentum e¤ect in the long run. Addressing this issue is part of our ongoing research agenda of studying the pro…tability of di¤erent strategies implemented over di¤erent time horizons using the methodology introduced in this paper.
One …nal caveat is in order. Our interpretation that momentum is not an anomaly is clearly contextual, because it is conceivable that any cross-sectional patterns in returns could be generated by behavioral biases rather than legitimate di¤erences in expected returns and risks of individual securities. It is however obvious from the development of the literature that momentum is viewed as anomalous because it is believed to be an idiosyncratic phenomenon. Our paper establishes that there is no momentum in the idiosyncratic components of security returns.
A reasonable criticism of our paper however remains that we do not present a speci…c model of expected returns that could generate the varying time-series behavior of momentum pro…ts.
While a fair criticism, we believe that the determination of an asset-pricing model that can explain the richness and variability of momentum pro…ts, as well as other patterns in the data, remains probably the most signi…cant challenge for our profession. And even if we were to develop such a model, the issue of estimation using small samples of medium-horizon returns would continue to pose signi…cant challenges to making reliable inferences. It is in this context that we believe that the methodology, as well as the evidence, presented in this paper should help further our understanding of both the cross-sectional and time-series behavior of asset prices.
Appendix: Pro…ts to Portfolio-based Momentum Strategies
Consider a market with N stocks and a momentum strategy on the basis of portfolios, each of which consists of exactly n individual stocks. Without loss of generality, assume that N can be evenly divided by n so that the momentum strategy concerns N=n base portfolios. Focus on the equal-weighting scheme for the base portfolio returns as well as the momentum portfolio return, so that
It can be shown that under the single factor return structure (4)- (8), the portfolio-based momentum strategy generates the following expected return
Cov(" it ; " i;t 1 );
where stock i in base portfolio p is denoted by the subscript (p; i). Note that the equation above degenerates to equation (10) when setting n = 1.
Breaking the products of sum into sum of self products and cross products, we get
where a few shorthands are de…ned as
Cov(" it ; " i;t 1 ),
The equation above documents separately the number of own products and self products. For instance, there are (N=n)n(n 1) cross products within N=n base portfolios, and N (N 1) cross products among all stocks. Collecting terms in the above equation, we have
For very large N , we have 1=N 0 and 1=N 2 0. Therefore, we obtain equations (13) and (14). This table reports the results from implementing momentum strategies using all stocks on the NYSE and AMEX between 1926 and 2006. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a sixmonth ranking period. These returns are then compared to a benchmark return (either equal-weighted or value-weighted market return) to separate winners from losers. The proceeds from selling losers are used to buy winners, with extreme winners/losers receiving the highest weights [see (1) for the equal-weighted strategy and (17) for the value-weighted strategy]. The resulting portfolio is held for the subsequent sixmonth holding period. The momentum pro…t is computed based on the compounded returns for individual stocks during the holding period. We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods, in order to mitigate market microstructure issues. This procedure is repeated in a rolling fashion for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts ranges from July, 1926 to June, 2006. In the following table, the four-digit numbers in the headers refer to the year and the month of the stamped time, i.e., the month in the gap. For each 13-month study period, we keep track of the momentum pro…t ( ), the dollar investments on the long position (lp), and the momentum pro…t scaled by the long position ( =lp). The time series averages of these three measures are reported below, along with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. Note that pro…ts are multiplied by 100. This table reports the results from implementing portfolio-based momentum strategies using all stocks on the NYSE/AMEX between 1926 and 2006. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a six-month ranking period. These returns are then compared to the equal-weighted market return to separate winners from losers. Stocks are then sorted by their strength within each category, with the strongest winning/losing stocks being ranked …rst. Base portfolios of size n are then formed by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time from each category. Speci…cally, the strongest n winning (losing) stocks are grouped in one winner (loser) portfolio; the next n winning (losing) stocks are grouped in the next winner (loser) portfolio; repeating this procedure until all winning (losing) stocks are part of some winner (loser) portfolio. We compute equal-weighted returns for the base portfolios in the ranking period and compare them to the equal-weighted market return to separate winner portfolios from losers. The proceeds from selling loser portfolios are used to buy winner portfolios, with extreme winners/losers receiving the highest weights [see (11) for the weighting function]. The resulting momentum portfolio is held for the subsequent six-month holding period. The momentum pro…t is calculated from the equal-weighted base portfolio returns for the holding period. We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods, in order to mitigate any market microstructure issues. This procedure is repeated in a rolling fashion for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts range from July, 1926 to June, 2006. We allow for ten di¤erent sizes for base portfolios, that is, n ranges from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 to 50. The four-digit numbers in the headers of the table refer to the year and the month of the stamped time, i.e., the month in the gap. For each 13-month study period, we keep track of the momentum pro…t ( ), the dollar investments on the long position (lp), and the momentum pro…t scaled by the long position, ( =lp). The time-series averages of these three measures are reported below, along with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. Note that pro…ts are multiplied by 100. This table reports the results from implementing portfolio-based momentum strategies using all stocks on the NYSE/AMEX between 1926 and 2006. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a six-month ranking period. These returns are then compared to the value-weighted market return to separate winners from losers. Stocks are then sorted by their strength within each category, with the strongest winning/losing stocks being ranked …rst. Base portfolios of size n are then formed by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time from each category. Speci…cally, the strongest n winning (losing) stocks are grouped in one winner (loser) portfolio; the next n winning (losing) stocks are grouped in the next winner (loser) portfolio; repeating this procedure until all winning (losing) stocks are part of some winner (loser) portfolio. We compute valueweighted returns for the base portfolios in the ranking period and compare them to the value-weighted market return to separate winner portfolios from losers. The proceeds from selling loser portfolios are used to buy winner portfolios, with extreme winners/losers receiving the highest weights [see (17) for the weighting function substituting the value-weighted base portfolio returns for the individual stock returns]. The resulting momentum portfolio is held for the subsequent six-month holding period. The momentum pro…t is calculated from the value-weighted base portfolio returns for the holding period. We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods, in order to mitigate any market microstructure issues. This procedure is repeated in a rolling fashion for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts range from July, 1926 to June, 2006. We allow for ten di¤erent sizes for base portfolios, that is, n ranges from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 to 50. The four-digit numbers in the headers of the table refer to the year and the month of the stamped time, i.e., the month in the gap. For each 13-month study period, we keep track of the momentum pro…t ( ), the dollar investments on the long position (lp), and the momentum pro…t scaled by the long position, ( =lp). The time-series averages of these three measures are reported below, along with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. Note that pro…ts are multiplied by 100. This table reports the results from implementing portfolio-based momentum strategies using all stocks on the NYSE/AMEX between 1926 and 2006. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a six-month ranking period. These returns are then compared to the equal-weighted market return to separate winners from losers. Stocks are then sorted by their strength within each category, with the strongest winning/losing stocks being ranked …rst. Base portfolios of size n are then formed by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time from each category. Speci…cally, the strongest n winning (losing) stocks are grouped in one winner (loser) portfolio; the next n winning (losing) stocks are grouped in the next winner (loser) portfolio; repeating this procedure until all winning (losing) stocks are part of some winner (loser) portfolio. We compute equal-weighted returns for the base portfolios in the ranking period and compare them to the equal-weighted market return to separate winner portfolios from losers. The proceeds from selling loser portfolios are used to buy winner portfolios, with extreme winners/losers receiving the highest weights [see (11) for the weighting function]. The resulting momentum portfolio is held for the subsequent six-month holding period. The momentum pro…t is calculated from the equal-weighted base portfolio returns for the holding period. We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods, in order to mitigate any market microstructure issues. This procedure is repeated in a rolling fashion for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts range from July, 1926 to June, 2006. We allow for ten di¤erent sizes for base portfolios, that is, n ranges from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 to 50. The four-digit numbers in the headers of the table refer to the year and the month of the stamped time, i.e., the month in the gap. For each 13-month study period, we keep track of the weighted sum of own-products of base portfolio returns, the weighted sum of cross-products of base portfolio returns, the un-weighted sum of cross-products of base portfolio returns, and the own-products of equal-weighted market returns. Note that all the own-and cross-products are de…ned as the products of returns in the ranking and holding periods, multiplied by 100. The time series averages of these four measures are reported below, along with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. This table reports the results from implementing portfolio-based momentum strategies using all stocks on the NYSE/AMEX between 1926 and 2006. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a six-month ranking period. We generate a uniform random number for each stock present in the ranking period, and sort stocks by the magnitude of the random number. Base portfolios of size n are then formed by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time. Speci…cally, n stocks with the largest random numbers are grouped in one base portfolio; the next n stocks are grouped in the next base portfolio; repeating this procedure until all stocks are assigned to portfolios. We compute equal-weighted returns for the base portfolios in the ranking period and compare them to the equal-weighted market return so as to separate winners from losers. The proceeds from selling loser portfolios are used to buy winner portfolios, with extreme winners/losers receiving the highest weights [see (11) for the weighting function]. The resulting momentum portfolio is held for the subsequent six-month holding period. The momentum pro…t is calculated from the equal-weighted base portfolio returns for the holding period. We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods, in order to mitigate any market microstructure issues. This procedure is repeated in a rolling fashion for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts range from July, 1926 to June, 2006. We allow for ten di¤erent sizes for base portfolios, that is, n ranges from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 to 50. The four-digit numbers in the headers of the table refer to the year and the month of the stamped time, i.e., the month in the gap. For each 13-month study period, we keep track of the momentum pro…t ( ), the dollar investments on the long position (lp), and the momentum pro…t scaled by the long position, ( =lp). The time-series averages of these three measures are reported below, along with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. Note that pro…ts are multiplied by 100. This table reports the results from implementing portfolio-based momentum strategies using all stocks on the NYSE/AMEX between 1926 and 2006. Monthly returns of individual stocks are …rst compounded over a six-month ranking period. We generate a uniform random number for each stock present in the ranking period, and sort stocks by the magnitude of the random number. Base portfolios of size n are then formed by sequentially picking o¤ n stocks at a time. Speci…cally, n stocks with the largest random numbers are grouped in one base portfolio; the next n stocks are grouped in the next base portfolio; repeating this procedure until all stocks are assigned to portfolios. We compute equal-weighted returns for the base portfolios in the ranking period and compare them to the equal-weighted market return so as to separate winners from losers. The proceeds from selling loser portfolios are used to buy winner portfolios, with extreme winners/losers receiving the highest weights [see (11) for the weighting function]. The resulting momentum portfolio is held for the subsequent six-month holding period. The momentum pro…t is calculated from the equal-weighted base portfolio returns for the holding period. We maintain a one-month gap between the ranking and holding periods, in order to mitigate any market microstructure issues. This procedure is repeated in a rolling fashion for the entire sample period, and the time stamp of momentum pro…ts range from July, 1926 to June, 2006. We allow for ten di¤erent sizes for base portfolios, that is, n ranges from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 to 50. The four-digit numbers in the headers of the table refer to the year and the month of the stamped time, i.e., the month in the gap. For each 13-month study period, we keep track of the weighted sum of own-products of base portfolio returns, the weighted sum of cross-products of base portfolio returns, the un-weighted sum of cross-products of base portfolio returns, and the own-products of equal-weighted market returns. Note that all the own-and cross-products are de…ned as the product of returns in the ranking and holding periods, multiplied by 100. The time series averages of these four measures are reported below, along with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics. 
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